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CHANGES IN THE ROLE OF LAWYERS AND 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN—HOW 
DO WE MEASURE WHETHER LEGAL REFORM 
LEADS TO REAL CHANGE?  
BRUCE E. ARONSON∗ 
There are certain Western schemers, envious of Japan’s ability to 
keep moving ahead . . . . These schemers have plans for infesting 
our society with hundreds of thousands of men cunningly trained in 
the arts of stopping all constructive activity, of bringing entire 
societies to a dead standstill. Yes, I speak of lawyers.1 
[Due to numerous reasons, including] expansion of the role of the 
legal profession as “doctors for the people’s social lives,” . . . 
greatly increasing the legal population is an urgent task . . . . The 
essential task is to secure and improve, both in quality and in 
quantity, the legal profession needed by the people of Japan.2 
INTRODUCTION 
Japan’s dramatic rise as the first non-Western nation to modernize 
successfully and to compete economically with the United States had a 
tremendous impact on American thinking in the 1980s. Japanese 
automobile manufacturers out-competing Detroit’s car makers somehow 
seemed more threatening than any effort by similar German companies. In 
addition, Japan seemed to be addressing issues of modern society more 
effectively than the United States, and numerous American commentators 
began to search for the “secret” to Japan’s success. Unfortunately, many of 
the “secrets” uncovered by popular commentators involved supposedly 
ingrained Japanese cultural traits, such as informality, cooperation, and 
 
 
 ∗ Associate Professor of Law, Creighton University School of Law. I thank participants in a 
conference entitled “Law in Japan: A Celebration of the Work of John Owen Haley,” held at 
Washington University School of Law on May 9–10, 2008, for comments on an earlier draft.  
 1. Supposed response of the Japanese “Minister of Motion” to a tongue-in-cheek proposal by 
columnist Russell Baker that we trade American lawyers for Japanese cars in order to even the playing 
field in trade between the United States and Japan. Russell Baker, Lawyers for Cars, N.Y. TIMES, June 
8, 1983, at A23. 
 2. JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL, RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM 
COUNCIL, ch. III, pt. 1–1 (2001), available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/judiciary/2001/0612 
report.html (report of a special legal reform council created by the Japanese Cabinet). 
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consensus, which were allegedly much more efficient and productive than 
our complicated systems of checks and balances, markets, and legal rules. 
This unchanging culturalism frequently substituted for, rather than 
provided, any real analysis of Japan’s strengths. It was also of little value 
as a prescription for America, as it was impossible to import. It did, 
however, sell many books and newspapers. 
Fortunately, John Haley met this critical need for scholarship reflecting 
a more reasoned and thoughtful analysis. He was uniquely qualified to 
undertake this daunting task and to light the way for a generation of 
scholars to follow his path. Starting in the 1970s, well before our current 
emphasis on empirical and interdisciplinary approaches, Haley utilized a 
number of current methodologies to challenge cultural stereotypes and 
analyze the Japanese legal system and society. 
His seminal work, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant,3 remains the 
gold standard for comparative studies due to its integration of three highly 
useful approaches. First, Haley used empirical data to challenge 
conventional wisdom. His data indicated that it was a lack of legal 
infrastructure rather than a cultural predisposition against the use of 
litigation that accounted for relatively low litigation rates in Japan. 
Second, he employed a historical perspective, arguing, for example, that if 
conciliation procedures were made mandatory in the interwar years for the 
purpose of suppressing litigation and societal upheaval dating from the 
1920s, it was unlikely that a cultural reluctance to litigate was the cause of 
a decline in litigation in the postwar years. Third, he looked beyond a 
bilateral comparison between the United States and Japan to examine 
available data on litigation from a variety of countries, concluding that 
while Japanese litigation rates were low, they were not extraordinarily so; 
if anything, the United States was the outlier due to its unusually high rate 
of litigation. 
Even after slaying the culturalism dragon (in the academy, even if not 
necessarily in popular discourse), Haley has continued to examine the 
relationship between the legal system and society (and has not shied away 
from using the term “culture”). He has valiantly attempted to describe 
what makes Japan different from the United States and other countries, 
and has also spent a great deal of thought on the question of continuity 
versus change in Japan.4 
 
 
 3. John Owen Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, 4 J. JAPANESE STUD. 359 (1978). 
 4. See, e.g., JOHN O. HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER: LAW AND THE JAPANESE 
PARADOX (1991); JOHN O. HALEY, THE SPIRIT OF JAPANESE LAW (2006). 
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While often reminding us of continuity when others emphasized 
change, Haley has also been active in the debate about what would 
constitute real change in Japan. In a 2005 article on the subject of whether 
there is a “Heisei transformation” (the “Heisei article”),5 Haley identifies 
three areas—electoral politics, the legal profession, and corporate 
governance—that would need to change in order to effect a transformation 
of Japanese society.6 He defined what would be a transformational change 
in each of these areas and concluded that while we may be in an era of 
Heisei reform, there has been no Heisei transformation. 
While I do not necessarily disagree with any of Haley’s conclusions in 
his Heisei article, that article highlights the difficulties we encounter in 
discussing the question of continuity versus change. One difficult 
challenge, which Haley has begun to address in his recent work, is the 
appropriate method for measuring and evaluating such change.7 Research 
efforts either tend to focus rather narrowly on case studies and emphasize 
change that has occurred, or, conversely, look for a complete systemic 
transformation and, finding none, conclude that all of the new laws and 
activities do not constitute any significant change. In either case, the 
choice of a focus or standard for measuring change seems highly outcome 
determinative. 
One result of this binary approach is that conclusions are fairly 
predictable depending on the standard or lens employed: there is much 
reform, but never any transformation. This is an unsurprising and likely 
accurate result if we only view change through a very narrow or very wide 
lens. Systems rarely, if ever, transform in the absence of war and 
occupation: evolution, rather than revolution, is the norm. On the other 
hand, in reality, incremental change may be highly significant to 
individual actors (businesses, consumers, etc.) in a society. The perplexing 
challenge is to find a way to reconcile the “macro” view of systems with 
the “micro” view of real world actors.  
 
 
 5. John O. Haley, Heisei Renewal or Heisei Transformation: Are Legal Reforms Really 
Changing Japan? 19 J. JAPANESE L. 5 (2005) [hereinafter Haley, Heisei]. See also John O. Haley, 
Japanese Law in Transition (paper presented at Change, Continuity, and Context: Japanese Law in the 
Twenty-First Century, a conference held at The University of Michigan Law School, Apr. 6–7, 2001, 
on file with author). A “Heisei transformation” refers to the possibility that Japan is currently (i.e., 
during the current emperor Akihito’s reign, which is the Heisei Era) undergoing a major societal 
transformation equivalent to earlier changes during the Meiji Era (beginning in 1868, as Japan 
restructured society in order to modernize and catch up with the West) and the post-World War II 
period.  
 6. Haley, Heisei, supra note 5, at 7. 
 7. See supra note 5. 
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This Essay explores the criteria for judging the significance of change 
brought about by legal reform through the examination of two significant 
areas in Japan about which Haley has written in the Heisei article and 
elsewhere: the role of lawyers and corporate governance. Although the 
prevalent view is that no transformational change has taken place in either 
area, altering the criteria or the weight assigned to them can significantly 
affect the conclusion. If we focus on the role of elite lawyers and the 
expansion of their role in society, there arguably is a significant change 
occurring in the legal profession in Japan. With respect to corporate 
governance, a greater emphasis on the monitoring of management, rather 
than on the often used maximization of shareholder value, might still lead 
to the same conclusion that there has not been any system-wide 
transformation, but may also better highlight important changes in specific 
areas of corporate governance in Japan. 
I. THE ROLE OF LAWYERS 
The legal profession has been an ongoing focus of Haley’s work. In 
The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, Haley characterized the traditionally 
small number and limited role of lawyers in Japan as parts of the lack of 
legal infrastructure that formed an institutional barrier to litigation.8 More 
broadly, one of his consistent themes has been that, due to a lack of formal 
enforcement power and mechanisms, many actors (the state, the judiciary, 
business) resort to informal, extralegal measures to conduct their activities, 
and that this phenomenon is a distinguishing characteristic of Japanese 
society. The Japanese legal profession and legal education system have 
recently undergone a great deal of reform,9 creating a pressing need to 
evaluate the significance of such reform.  
What would constitute a transformation of the legal profession? In his 
Heisei article, Haley mentions three criteria: (1) a significant increase in 
the number of lawyers and demand for entry into the legal profession; (2) 
an improved professional legal education, provided by new graduate-level 
law schools that go well beyond mere preparation for the bar exam; and 
(3) societal recognition of the expertise and value of the new law school 
graduates, as compared with generalists who have completed an 
 
 
 8. Haley, supra note 3, at 381–83. 
 9. For an overview of the legal reform process, see, e.g., Setsuo Miyazawa, Law Reform, 
Lawyers, and Access to Justice, in JAPANESE BUSINESS LAW (Gerald Paul McAlinn ed., 2007); Kahei 
Rokumoto, Overhauling the Judicial System: Japan’s Response to the Globalizing World, 20 J. 
JAPANESE L. 7 (2005). 
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undergraduate degree in law, so that these law school graduates will find 
new avenues of employment in business and government.10 
This is a reasonable set of criteria for attempting to measure any 
transformation in the importance of lawyers and the law in Japanese 
society. However, the first criterion, the supply of lawyers, should be 
supplemented by incorporating a corresponding element for the demand 
for legal services. The second criterion, legal education, which measures 
an important cause or condition of possible change, could be de-
emphasized in favor of an attempt to look at actual results. The third 
criterion, new positions in business and government for law school 
graduates, clearly considers results but looks at long-term issues that 
would represent a complete “transformation” of the legal profession. In 
order to think about the possibility of current or ongoing significant 
change in the legal profession, I would instead focus more narrowly on the 
role of lawyers, specifically on the question of whether the role of lawyers 
and the range of their activities have expanded significantly.  
The demand for legal services is a critical factor that underlies any 
significant change in the legal profession.11 Lawyers tend to be 
conservative and “follow the client”; it is unlikely that the supply of legal 
services would increase in anticipation of a future increase in demand.12 
The legal profession is important precisely because of this phenomenon—
the legal profession would gain in importance only as a result of other 
societal changes that create new, significant demand for legal services.  
An expansion of the role of lawyers and the range of their activities is 
probably the best proxy for measuring whether business and government 
use lawyers (and care about the law) as opposed to their traditional resort 
to informal, extralegal means for managing their operations and 
accomplishing their goals. Such an expansion would be evidence of a 
change from informal “administrative guidance”13 to a more transparent, 
 
 
 10. See Haley, Heisei, supra note 5, at 10–13. 
 11. Demand and supply are both important criteria, and their interaction is a significant aspect of 
law firm growth. Commentators have constructed academic theories concerning law firms’ economic 
incentives for growth from both supply-side and demand-side perspectives. For a summary of the 
literature, see Bruce E. Aronson, Elite Law Firm Mergers and Reputational Competition: Is Bigger 
Really Better? An International Comparison, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNT’L L. 763, 773–76 (2007). To date, 
there has been an overemphasis in Japan on the low supply of lawyers and insufficient attention paid to 
the important demand aspect. See infra note 23.  
 12. For arguments that lawyers are generally conservative or risk-averse, see Aronson, supra 
note 11, at 776 n.28.  
 13. Although formulations differ, administrative guidance is generally described as government 
agencies obtaining informal cooperation from industries, companies, or individuals to take or refrain 
from taking some particular action. See generally Mitsuo Matsushita, The Legal Framework of Trade 
and Investment in Japan, 27 HARV. INT’L L.J. 361, 375–76 (1986). There is no clear legal definition of 
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rule-based form of administration in which businesses would consult 
lawyers rather than bureaucrats for advice on the permissibility of products 
and activities. 
In considering the criterion of an expanded role for lawyers, this Essay 
focuses on a relatively small number of “elite” law firms.14 Although this 
focus could be questioned, it is consistent with Haley’s emphasis on 
creating a more important role for the legal profession with respect to 
business and government—it is the elite lawyers who are in a position to 
interact with big business and government and to potentially increase the 
range of lawyers’ activities. Significant change in the legal profession 
could also theoretically occur from an entirely different source, such as a 
large increase in public interest law activities that would pressure 
government and business from the outside rather than work with them on 
the inside. However, while the elite law firms rapidly expand, there is no 
evidence of an upsurge in public interest law.15  
Considering these criteria, has there been a significant change in the 
legal profession in Japan? In his Heisei article a few years ago, Haley 
seemed unimpressed by recent changes in the legal profession. He viewed 
the large Japanese corporate law firms as a result of consolidation, not 
natural growth, and the recent increase in the number of lawyers and the 
demand to become lawyers as not very significant.16 Similarly, he saw 
changes in legal education as insufficient to change the basic direction of 
 
 
administrative guidance, as attempts to formulate a definition often wind up characterizing it by what 
it is not—it is not formal administrative action (i.e., shobun, or disposition), which would be subject to 
judicial review. See generally John O. Haley, Japanese Administrative Law, 19 LAW IN JAPAN 1 
(1986).  
 14. “Elite” law firm is intended as a neutral term of art that is widely used in the literature 
analyzing the structure and functioning of law firms. It refers to firms that provide general legal 
services to large corporations (i.e., not boutique firms) and use specialized skills to handle large, 
complex matters on a national scale for these clients. In most countries they correspond closely with 
large corporate law firms. See Aronson, supra note 11, at 782 (discussing this functional definition of 
elite law firms and comparing such firms with a smaller subset of the highest ranking first-tier law 
firms).  
 15. This Essay does not address the normative question of what form of change in the legal 
profession is desirable from a societal perspective. It focuses on the market for corporate legal services 
which may lead to an expanded role for lawyers, that is, on the rapidly expanding and changing area of 
elite lawyers, rather than on societal needs. Although some new consumer litigation has emerged 
recently in Japan, and there is potential for further development in that area, significant difficulties 
remain in increasing the number and activities of public interest lawyers. See, e.g., Bruce E. Aronson, 
The Brave New World of Lawyers in Japan: Proceedings of a Panel Discussion on the Growth of 
Corporate Law Firms and the Role of Lawyers in Japan, 21 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 45, 75, 78 (2007) 
(speaker: Toshirō Ueyanagi, the leading plaintiffs’ lawyer for shareholder litigation in Japan). For data 
on the rapidly increasing number of elite lawyers, see infra note 24 and accompanying text.  
 16. Haley, Heisei, supra note 5, at 10–11. 
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such education from one of bar preparation to something more 
professionally and socially beneficial.17 
However, one could construct a persuasive argument that significant 
change has occurred, or at least is occurring, if my additional suggested 
criteria are incorporated into the analysis. An important focus of this 
inquiry would be consideration of whether there has been an expansion in 
the role and range of work activities of elite lawyers.18 This approach 
would also involve some disagreement over the pace and extent of change, 
since change has occurred rapidly at elite law firms over the last few years. 
In examining change in the legal profession, let us begin with the 
demand for new legal services from elite lawyers. In the past, there was a 
traditional division between Japanese corporations’ use of Tokyo-based 
“international” lawyers for cross-border transactions and their internal 
handling of domestic transactions without resort to lawyers. This division 
of labor, based on the use of non-legal “relational contracting” in Japan, 
has significantly eroded. The large Japanese law firms no longer refer to 
themselves as international firms (shogai jimusho), as the bulk of their 
work has changed over the last decade from cross-border work to domestic 
work.19 This surge in domestic work has come from a number of new 
areas, including new financial products, compliance and corporate 
governance, and domestic litigation. Currently, domestic litigation 
includes large domestic Japanese institutions suing each other and tax 
litigation by both individuals and corporations against the government.20 
Most significantly, Japanese lawyers consistently claim that there has been 
a real change in the Japanese style of administration—businesses now 
consult lawyers on legal rules and procedures rather than consulting 
informally with government bureaucrats.21  
This increase in demand for domestic corporate legal services also has 
an international aspect. In some cases, this new domestic legal work 
 
 
 17. Id. at 11–13. 
 18. The potential for Japanese lawyers in leading urban areas to expand their role beyond 
traditional litigation-oriented activities was recognized by some at an early stage. See Takao Tanase, 
The Urbanization of Lawyers and Its Functional Significance: Expansion in the Range of Work 
Activities and Change in Social Role, 13 LAW IN JAPAN 20 (Bruce E. Aronson trans., 1980) (arguing 
that the high concentration of lawyers in the metropolises of Tokyo and Osaka was due to the 
attractive prospect of expanding their traditional range of work activities and social role). 
 19. See Aronson, supra note 15, at 56 (speaker: Hisashi Hara). See also Zadankai: Daikibo 
Hōritsu Jimusho no Gendai to Shōrai [Roundtable: The Present and Future of Large-Scale Law Firms] 
57 Jiyū To Seigi 12, 46–49 (May 2006) [hereinafter Zadankai].  
 20. See Aronson, supra note 15, at 56–58. 
 21. Zadankai, supra note 19, at 56–57 (speaker: Takashi Yoneda). This has also reportedly 
resulted in an expanded role for lawyers in corporate governance activities. See id. at 78–79 (speaker: 
Toru Ishiguro). 
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involves the Japanese domestic version of long and complicated groups of 
contracts (in areas such as asset securitization and project finance) used 
overseas but hitherto unknown in Japan. The new focus on domestic legal 
services has also been spurred by an opening up to, and increased 
competition from, foreign law firms, which are now permitted to form 
domestic partnerships with Japanese law firms, and which are increasingly 
successful in competing with domestic Japanese firms for cross-border 
transactions.22 
Let us next turn to the question of the supply of lawyers. This is a 
serious issue, although it has often been overemphasized as the key 
constraint on the growth of Japanese law firms.23 Looking at the number 
of (elite) lawyers and law firm size, we find that within the last few years 
members of the top group of Big Four Japanese law firms increased their 
size from around one hundred attorneys to three hundred or more.24 One 
factor was a series of mergers which surprised the legal profession.25 
However, of equal importance was a substantial increase in the hiring of 
new attorneys.26 During the past decade, a typical entering class of newly 
minted attorneys for a Big Four law firm has grown from less than ten to 
somewhere in the twenties or thirties.27 The ratio of associates to partners 
has increased from roughly 1:1 to 3:1.28 This rapid expansion has fueled 
 
 
 22. Id. at 65 (speaker: Hisashi Hara). 
 23. The issue of the supply of lawyers has been emphasized in Japan due to both the small 
absolute number of Japanese lawyers and complaints by Japanese lawyers that the limited supply is the 
most important constraint on the growth of Japanese law firms. For more information on the latter 
argument, see, e.g., Yasuharu Nagashima & E. Anthony Zaloom, The Rise of the Large Business Law 
Firm and Its Prospects for the Future, in LAW IN JAPAN: A TURNING POINT 136 (Daniel H. Foote ed., 
2007) (in which the founding partner of one of the leading Japanese law firms in Tokyo argued that the 
shortage of lawyers is “the most fundamental problem” facing Japanese law firms in light of the recent 
rise in demand for business lawyers).  
 24. For data on the largest Japanese firms from 1998, 2001, and 2005, see Aronson, supra note 
15, at 83. According to their websites, the number of Japanese attorneys at the Big Four firms is 
currently as follows: Nishimura & Asahi had 407 attorneys as of Oct. 1, 2008; Nagashima Ohno & 
Tsunematsu had 312 Japanese attorneys as of Oct. 1, 2008; Anderson Mori & Tomotsune had “over 
240” attorneys as of Jan. 1, 2008; and Mori Hamada Matsumoto had “over 260” attorneys. Nishimura 
& Asahi, Firm Overview, http://www.jurists.co.jp/en/firm/outline.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2008); 
Nagashima Ohno & Tsunematsu, Firm Profile, http://www.noandt.com/english/summary/firm 
profile.html; Anderson Mori & Tomotsune, What’s New, http://www.andersonmoritomotsune.com/en/ 
whatsnew/index_080101_2.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2008); Mori Hamada Matsumoto, Lawyers, 
http://www.mhmjapan.com/home_en/lawyers/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2008).  
 25. See generally Aronson, supra note 11, at 810–22. 
 26. See Aronson, supra note 15, at 63 (speaker: Toru Ishiguro). 
 27. See Zadankai, supra note 19, at 39 (speaker: Akira Kosugi). The trend of larger incoming 
classes has continued as the largest law firm, Nishimura & Asahi, had a class of forty-two new 
associates in January 2008. Nishimura & Asahi, Topics: News, http://www.jurists.co.jp/en/topics/ 
others_5129.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2008). 
 28. See Aronson supra note 15, at 86 tbl. 3. 
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intense competition among the firms to hire the best new attorneys and has 
significantly increased the number of elite Japanese attorneys who actively 
engage in these new areas of legal services.  
There is little argument concerning Haley’s point that Japan’s new 
graduate level law schools have not initially achieved their goal of a new 
professional legal education that would be valued by business and 
government even if the law school graduate did not pass the national bar 
exam and become a licensed attorney. If this had occurred, it would have 
been an important indicator of transformative change in the legal 
profession since professional legal expertise would be more important and 
highly valued than in the past.29 
However, the absence of such an indicator of the value of a law school 
education may not be decisive to our analysis. If it is the elite lawyers who 
are the agents of change, the question can be rephrased as follows: To 
what extent have elite lawyers come to play a larger role in business and 
government? As noted above, the role of elite law firms acting as outside 
counsel appears to have expanded substantially.30 What about the activities 
of lawyers within business and government? Here the evidence is less 
clear. In recent years the number of qualified lawyers has increased both in 
corporations and the government, albeit from a very low base. 
Additionally, there has been little study of the role of these new lawyers in 
business and no study of their role in government.  
Surveys by the Japan In-House Lawyers Association indicate that the 
total number of in-house lawyers has increased from 64 in 2001 to 242 in 
2007.31 For the central government, the number of in-house government 
lawyers increased from 40 in 2004 to 69 in 2006.32 
 
 
 29. There is a long-standing argument in Japan about the definition of legal professionals and the 
importance of lawyer substitutes. This is particularly true in the corporate context, as some claim that 
the real issue is the overall importance of the legal division or section within a corporation, rather than 
the number of qualified Japanese attorneys employed. For a comparative discussion of the various 
categories of legal professionals in Japan, see, e.g., Masanobu Kato, The Role of Law and Lawyers in 
Japan and the United States, 1987 BYU L. REV. 627.  
 30. See supra notes 19–22 and accompanying text. 
 31. See Nihon Soshikinai Bengoshi Kyōkai [Japan In-house Lawyers Ass’n], Kigyōnai Bengoshi 
no Ninzū to Shozoku Kigyō ni kan suru Chōsa 2001nen [2001 Report on the Number and Corporate 
Affiliation of In-house Lawyers], available at http://www.in-house.jpn.org/in-house_statistics_2001_ 
pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2008); NIHON SOSHIKINAI BENGOSHI KYŌKAI [JAPAN IN-HOUSE LAWYERS 
ASS’N], KIGYŌNAI BENGOSHI NO NINZŪ TO SHOZOKU KIGYŌ NI KAN SURU CHŌSA 2007 NEN 
SHIMOHANKI [SECOND HALF 2007 REPORT ON THE NUMBER AND CORPORATE AFFILIATION OF IN-
HOUSE LAWYERS], available at http://www.in-house.jpn.org/in-house_statistics_2007_2.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 17, 2008). This 2007 figure also represents a substantial increase from 165 at the end of 
2006. See NIHON SOSHIKINAI BENGOSHI KYŌKAI [JAPAN IN-HOUSE LAWYERS ASS’N], KIGYŌNAI 
BENGOSHI NO NINZŪ TO SHOZOKU KIGYŌ NI KAN SURU CHŌSA 2006 NEN [2006 REPORT ON THE 
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This recent trend was facilitated by a regulatory change in 2005 that 
was part of legal reform efforts. An amendment to article 30 of the 
Practicing Attorneys Law changed a provision that required advance bar 
association approval of a licensed Japanese attorney (bengoshi) going to 
work for a profit-making enterprise to one that now contains only a 
notification requirement.33 It also removed a restriction on bengoshi acting 
as civil servants. Corporations’ and the government’s increasing 
willingness to make lateral hires has added to this trend. 
Corporate use of in-house attorneys began with the hiring of foreign 
attorneys to deal with cross-border transactions and foreign law issues. 
Over time, however, law department personnel came to focus on domestic 
matters and corporations tended to use outside counsel for cross-border 
transactions. The recent influx of in-house bengoshi has in fact consisted 
of attorneys used primarily for domestic matters.34 
As noted above, the Big Four law firms have rapidly increased the 
number of their associates and have created a pyramid structure. One 
result is that new associates can no longer expect to make partner,35 thus 
creating a new pool of talented and experienced attorneys with the 
potential to enter into new career paths outside of law firms in business 
and government. In addition, the increase in the number of newly admitted 
attorneys each year has made it easier for corporations to hire talented 
attorneys directly.36  
With respect to attorneys employed by the central government, the 
largest number is at the Financial Services Agency.37 It has also become 
increasingly common for lawyers at large Japanese law firms to work 
temporarily for a government agency for a few years on “secondment” 
 
 
NUMBER AND CORPORATE AFFILIATION OF IN-HOUSE LAWYERS], available at http://www.in-
house.jpn.org/in-house_statistics_2006_pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2008).  
 32. See Nihon Soshikinai Bengoshi Kyōkai [Japan In-house Lawyers Ass’n], Gyōsei Chōnai 
Bengoshi no Ninzū to Shozoku Chō ni kan suru Chōsa 2004nen [2004 Report on the Number and 
Agency Affiliation of In-house Government Lawyers], available at http://www.in-house.jpn.org/ 
gv_lawyer2004.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2008); NIHON SOSHIKINAI BENGOSHI KYŌKAI [JAPAN IN-
HOUSE LAWYERS ASS’N], GYŌSEI CHŌNAI BENGOSHI NO NINZŪ TO SHOZOKU CHŌ NI KAN SURU 
CHŌSA 2006NEN [2006 REPORT ON THE NUMBER AND AGENCY AFFILIATION OF IN-HOUSE 
GOVERNMENT LAWYERS], available at http://www.in-house.jpn.org/gv_lawyer2006.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 17, 2008) [hereinafter THE 2006 REPORT].  
 33. See Bengoshi Hō [Practicing Attorney Law], Law No. 205 of 1949, art. 30. 
 34. See Toshimitsu Kitagawa & Luke Nottage, Globalization of Japanese Corporations and the 
Development of Corporate Legal Departments: Problems and Prospects, in RAISING THE BAR: THE 
EMERGING LEGAL PROFESSION IN EAST ASIA 201, 246 (William P. Alford ed., 2007). 
 35. See Aronson, supra note 15, at 63 (speaker: Hisashi Hara). 
 36. See Kitagawa & Nottage, supra note 34, at 254. 
 37. See THE 2006 REPORT, supra note 32. 
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from their law firms. In addition, government agencies, which have in the 
past sent employees with an undergraduate law degree overseas to study in 
Master of Law programs, have recently begun to send employees to 
Japanese law schools where they might take the bar exam and qualify as 
lawyers in Japan.  
The significance of this recent increase in attorneys working for 
corporations and the central government is difficult to assess, since it 
depends both on the willingness of business and government to continue to 
expand their hiring of legal professionals and on the function and work 
activities of the attorneys within these organizations. Since there are 
indications that bengoshi in corporations engage primarily in domestic 
matters,38 this might herald the beginning of a trend of gradually replacing 
generalists with qualified legal professionals.39 Further research is needed 
on the role of lawyers in government. It appears that their primary role is 
not to create a governmental enforcement function, the absence of which 
Haley has long cited as a distinguishing characteristic of Japan.40 
However, to the extent they are engaged, at agencies like the Financial 
Services Agency, in drafting and interpreting rules and regulations, such 
activities could serve to help increase transparency through clearer rules-
based administration. 
In sum, the greatest change to date is the expansion of the range of 
work activities of elite lawyers due to an increase in demand for their 
services. If we accept this as an important criterion, then arguably there 
has been a significant change in the legal profession. Activities of lawyers 
in business and government have recently begun to increase, but further 
evidence is necessary to evaluate whether such activities are contributing 
to significant change.  
II. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Like the legal profession, Japan’s early economic success also had a 
profound impact on our view of comparative corporate governance. There 
has similarly been a great deal of legal reform of corporate governance in 
Japan, including recent overhauls of corporate and securities law.41 Unlike 
 
 
 38. See Kitagawa & Nottage, supra note 34, at 247. 
 39. A related point is the apparent change in how corporations select and utilize outside law 
firms, with a reported trend toward retaining outside counsel on a case-by-case basis in accordance 
with its expertise and experience, rather than through the traditional methods of introductions and 
long-term personal relationships. See id. at 249. 
 40. See supra note 4. 
 41. See, e.g., Luke R. Nottage et al., Japan’s Gradual Transformation in Corporate Governance, 
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change in the legal profession, however, there is substantial literature on 
comparative corporate governance, including articles analyzing corporate 
governance reforms and change in Japan. 
The typical approach is to classify corporate governance systems in 
accordance with one or more of the following bases: (1) the social role of 
corporations (a narrow focus on maximization of shareholder wealth 
versus a broader focus on stakeholders and society), (2) ownership 
structure (diversified shareholders and the issue of agency costs versus 
concentrated shareholders and the problem of the protection of minority 
shareholders), and (3) monitoring of management (independent directors 
plus institutional investors and a market for corporate control versus 
monitoring by banks or other financial institutions). 
The United States and the United Kingdom are generally classified into 
one type of system characterized by diversified ownership; an emphasis on 
maximization of shareholder value; and monitoring of management by 
independent directors, institutional investors, and a market for corporate 
control. Japan and Germany are generally placed on the other side of the 
divide, with stakeholder systems having concentrated ownership and 
monitoring by banks or other large financial institutions that are also 
shareholders.42 Commentators who have looked at legal reform and its 
effects generally start with the basic assumption that either corporate 
governance systems will converge through globalization and competition 
(which usually means that other systems will become more like the United 
States) or, conversely, that the systems will continue to go their separate 
ways due to path dependence.43 
Japanese corporate governance has typically been characterized by 
Japan specialists consistently with the above comparative corporate 
governance classification scheme, i.e., as a stakeholder system (with an 
 
 
in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE 21ST CENTURY: JAPAN’S GRADUAL TRANSFORMATION, app. 
(forthcoming 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1121510 (last visited Oct. 17, 2008), for an 
updated list of legal reforms in Japanese corporate governance. 
 42. For a classification of corporate governance systems along these lines, see, e.g., Marc 
Goergen et al., Recent Developments in German Corporate Governance, 28 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 
175, 177 tbl.1 (2008). However, not all commentators accept this traditional classification of corporate 
governance systems. A notable exception is a group of corporate law academics who adopt a law and 
economics approach and emphasize the functional similarities among corporate governance systems in 
dealing with common problems. See REINIER R. KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE 
LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (2004).  
 43. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reiner Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 
GEO. L.J. 439 (2001) (advocating convergence); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path 
Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127 (1999) (advocating path 
dependence). 
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emphasis on lifetime employment) with concentrated ownership (due to 
keiretsu and cross-shareholding) and bank monitoring.44  
The result is a very clear dichotomy of the type mentioned earlier: 
some articles, which focus more narrowly on case studies in Japan, 
emphasize ongoing or potentially significant change, while other articles, 
which take a broader, systemic view, typically look for a significantly 
greater emphasis on the maximization of shareholder wealth as the 
standard (or, at least, primary criterion) for measuring significant change, 
and find none.45 
Corporate governance is not Haley’s main area of research, but the 
criteria for measuring transformational change set forth in his Heisei 
article are generally compatible with the mainstream corporate governance 
literature: less control by entrenched career managers and more 
shareholder democracy. Achieving these goals would, in turn, require 
changes in the employment structure (i.e., an end to the hiring of new 
graduates as generalists to become core managers, centralized personnel 
offices, lifetime employment, and the lack of any real lateral market for 
managers). In addition, any such change would also likely reduce the role 
of friendly, stable shareholders, whose managers are similarly entrenched 
and share a similar view of appropriate corporate structure and 
operations.46 
In his Heisei article, Haley finds that, despite the long list of corporate 
law reforms, Japanese corporate governance has not fundamentally 
changed: large public companies “continue to be controlled by career 
managers who view themselves as the primary stakeholders and actively 
prevent shareholders from exercising either rights of control or claims to 
their residual share.”47 Like his criteria, Haley’s conclusion is typical of 
the comparative corporate governance literature on Japan. 
 
 
 44. See, e.g., MASAHIKO AOKI, INFORMATION, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, AND INSTITUTIONAL 
DIVERSITY: COMPETITIVENESS IN JAPAN, THE USA, AND THE TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES (Stacy Jehlik 
trans., 2000) (1995). This view has been consistently challenged by the work of Mark Ramseyer, who 
believes that keiretsu, bank monitoring, and other features often attributed to Japanese corporate 
governance are myths. See, e.g., YOSHIRO MIWA & J. MARK RAMSEYER, THE FABLE OF THE 
KEIRETSU: URBAN LEGENDS OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY (2006). 
 45. For a good example of the latter, see Curtis J. Milhaupt, A Lost Decade for Japanese 
Corporate Governance Reform?: What’s Changed, What Hasn’t, and Why (Columbia Law Sch. Ctr. 
for Law & Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 234, 2003), available at http://www.law.columbia.edu/ 
center_program/law_economics/wp_listing_1/wp_author#83138 (last visited Oct. 17, 2008) (noting 
that while corporate law reform has been extensive, it has not yet resulted in a new set of good 
corporate governance practices). 
 46. See Haley, Heisei, supra note 5, at 13–15. 
 47. Id. at 13. 
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Although an increased emphasis on maximization of shareholder 
wealth is the most popular criterion in comparative corporate governance 
generally and in studies of Japanese corporate governance reform, it is not 
a universally accepted precondition to achieving significant reform. For 
example, the OECD principles of corporate governance take no view on 
the social role of corporations and are broad enough to encompass 
different governance systems.48 They both emphasize the importance of 
the maximization of shareholder value and accommodate the principle of 
governance on behalf of stakeholders. In this sense, corporate governance 
can be understood as a means to fulfill corporate goals, however they may 
be defined in a particular system. Accordingly, emphasis on the 
maximization of shareholder wealth could be seen as analyzing change in 
a stakeholder system through an inappropriate application of the central 
element of a shareholder system.49  
To the extent that many countries with stakeholder systems, such as 
Japan and Germany, have accepted a greater emphasis on the 
maximization of shareholder value as one goal of corporate governance 
reform, it may be fair to measure the actual implementation of such 
rhetoric. It is difficult, however, to imagine a country radically 
transforming its corporate governance structure or fundamental approach 
from a stakeholder to a shareholder-centered system. The social role of 
corporations is the most fundamental of the three bases for classification 
of corporate governance systems noted earlier. It is also the most resistant 
to dramatic change. In both Japan and Germany, there has been substantial 
legal reform and some change in practices, placing a somewhat greater 
emphasis on shareholders and somewhat lesser emphasis on company 
employees—a partial reprioritizing of the importance of various 
stakeholders within stakeholder systems.  
In both countries, the vast majority of commentators unsurprisingly 
finds that the fundamental structure and approach of the corporate 
governance system remains intact.50 It is interesting to note that the few 
 
 
 48. See OECD, OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2004), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/corporate/principles.htm. 
 49. More precisely, the agency costs typically associated with a shareholder-oriented system 
result from the conflict between managers and shareholders, with managers acting in their own self-
interest rather than in the interests of shareholders. By way of contrast, stakeholder systems often have 
block shareholders. The basic conflict in stakeholder systems is often described as being between these 
block shareholders and minority shareholders, rather than between management and shareholders 
generally. See, e.g., Goergen et al., supra note 42. 
 50. See, e.g., Milhaupt, supra note 45; Andreas Hackethal et al., Banks and German Corporate 
Governance: On the Way to a Capital Market-Based System?, 13 CORP. GOVERNANCE: INT’L REV. 
397 (2005). 
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commentators who do find significant systemic change in both Japan and 
Germany focus on employment and labor law, rather than on corporate 
law.51 This focus acts to emphasize the significance of change that results 
from even a relative lowering of priority for employees compared to other 
stakeholders. 
Is there a middle ground for measuring change that is “significant” but 
does not fundamentally change the underlying corporate governance 
system? What would be the criteria for measuring such change?52 
One could argue that we should abandon the traditional classification 
of corporate governance systems as a basis for measuring change because 
of a number of problems inherent in utilizing this approach.53 A number of 
recent efforts have moved in that direction.54 
If, however, we accept the mainstream approach of classification and 
analysis of corporate governance systems, we can consider the relevance 
and appropriate weight assigned to all three of the bases of classification 
of corporate governance systems. The emphasis in the literature, which 
focuses primarily on the criterion of the social role of corporations and 
maximization of shareholder value, may be misplaced. A more balanced 
 
 
 51. See Takashi Araki, Corporate Governance Reforms and Labor and Employment Relations in 
Japan: Whither Japan’s Practice-Dependent Stakeholder Model? 1 U. TOKYO J.L. & POL. 45 (2004); 
Christel Lane, Changes in Corporate Governance of German Corporations: Convergence to the 
Anglo-American Model? (ESRC Ctr. for Bus. Research, Univ. of Cambridge, Working Paper No. 259, 
2003), available at www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/WP259.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2008). 
 52. Corporate governance scholars have introduced a number of intermediate views on the 
question of the possible convergence of corporate governance systems. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, 
Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 329 
(2001) (emphasizing functional convergence over formal convergence); John C. Coffee, Jr., The 
Future As History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its 
Implications, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 641 (1999) (arguing for functional convergence through stock market 
cross-listings). 
 53. Comparisons of corporate governance systems often rely on idealized, static stereotypes, and 
in some cases include implicit value judgments concerning what constitutes the “best” system. See 
Bruce E. Aronson, Reconsidering the Importance of Law in Japanese Corporate Governance: 
Evidence from the Daiwa Bank Shareholder Derivative Case, 36 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 11, 53–56 
(2003) [hereinafter Aronson, Daiwa]. In addition, corporate governance reform may be motivated by a 
number of purposes that relate to economic objectives, such as a desire to emulate the economic 
dynamism of a country like the United States or to increase investment by foreign institutional 
investors, rather than a desire to improve corporate governance per se. See, e.g., Bruce E. Aronson, 
What Can We Learn from U.S. Corporate Governance? A Critical Analysis, 2 U. TOKYO J.L. & POL. 
41 (2005). 
 54. Commentators on Japanese corporate governance, particularly those outside the United 
States, have recently emphasized that the gradual or incremental reform arguably occurring in Japan is 
typical of institutional change and should not be subject to an “all-or-nothing” transformational 
standard. See, e.g., Masahiko Aoki, Whither Japan’s Corporate Governance?, in CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN: INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ORGANIZATIONAL DIVERSITY 427 (Masahiko 
Aoki et al. eds., 2007); Nottage et al., supra note 41.  
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approach would consider all of the bases for classification as criteria in 
arriving at a conclusion as to whether significant change has occurred. 
In terms of the criterion of ownership structure, over the past decade 
there has been substantial change in the ownership structure of public 
corporations in Japan. The percentage of shares held by the traditional 
group of management-friendly shareholders, i.e., banks and insurance 
companies, has declined steadily, while the percentage held by foreign 
investors has increased dramatically.55 This is one factor in the rise of 
M&A transactions and hostile takeover attempts in Japan over the last few 
years. Although this area contains considerable potential for change, it 
may be too early to contradict the conclusion of Haley’s Heisei article that 
the traditional cross-shareholding system continues to function to protect 
entrenched management in Japanese corporations. Foreign shareholders 
have yet to ally with domestic Japanese institutional investors to create a 
functioning market for corporate control, although this is an area that bears 
close watching.  
The most useful criterion for measuring meaningful change may be the 
monitoring of management. This approach is based on viewing corporate 
governance as an attempt to achieve an appropriate balance between 
providing management with the discretion to make decisions and achieve 
good business performance with the conflicting desire to constrain 
management, i.e., to provide a reasonable set of incentives to encourage 
management to act in good faith to fulfill its fiduciary duties to act 
primarily on behalf of the corporation and its shareholders.  
Discussion of the monitoring of management typically begins with the 
role of independent directors. However, the effectiveness of independent 
directors is questionable. Countries like China and Korea are willing to 
embrace the concept of independent directors for listed corporations 
precisely because the inclusion of a number of nominally independent 
directors is unlikely to have a real impact on managerial authority. In 
addition, corporations in those countries may actually be aiming at an 
important collateral benefit derived from the introduction of independent 
directors—a greater willingness of large institutional investors (mostly 
from the United States and the United Kingdom) to invest in companies 
that incorporate familiar governance devices such as independent directors 
while operating in an otherwise weak corporate governance environment. 
 
 
 55. See Tokyo Stock Exchange Group, 2007 Shareownership Survey (June 18, 2008), 
http://www.tse.or.jp/english/market/data/shareownership/english2007.pdf. 
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Accordingly, rather than focus primarily on the identity of the 
particular actors who are assigned to fulfill this monitoring function (e.g., 
independent directors, institutional investors, or main banks), it might be 
more productive to consider the extent to which a corporate governance 
system provides any would-be monitor of management the necessary 
environment and tools to be effective. In this sense, if the corporate 
governance system in the United States generates more effective 
monitoring of management than that of countries such as Japan, that result 
may be attributable primarily to two underlying features of the American 
system—greater information disclosure and enforcement, particularly 
private enforcement—rather than to the particular formal mechanisms that 
are thought to monitor management.  
Does a greater focus on the monitoring of management lead to a 
different result when evaluating whether there has been significant 
systemic change in corporate governance in Japan? Viewed from this 
perspective, Japan has arguably still not done enough to create a 
systemwide environment conducive to the effective monitoring of 
management.56 At the same time, however, there are a number of specific 
areas within corporate governance where change arguably has resulted in 
an altered operating environment and created a partial constraint on 
management behavior. Therefore, the more difficult question remains: 
How do we evaluate the areas in which important changes have occurred 
not only in law, but also in corporate practices? 
One such area is corporate compliance and internal controls, which 
began with a court decision in the Daiwa Bank shareholder litigation in 
200057 and was incorporated into Japan’s Corporation Codes in 2005. 
Another would probably be the area of mergers and acquisitions and 
defensive measures.58 Hostile takeovers remain difficult and no one claims 
that Japan has established an effective market for corporate control. 
However, this was an area of only theoretical concern just five years ago. 
Today, hundreds of Japanese companies have adopted defensive measures; 
all large corporations follow the area closely and incorporate it into their 
decision-making. 
 
 
 56. It should be noted, however, that recent overhauls of both the corporate and securities laws 
have the potential to be a force for significant change, particularly the increased information disclosure 
provided under the securities law (the so-called Japanese version of Sarbanes-Oxley, or “J-SOX”). See 
Kaisha Hō [Corporation Code], Law No. 86 of 2005; Kinyū Shōhin Torihiki Hō [The Financial 
Instruments Exchange Law], Law No. 65 of 2006. 
 57. See generally Aronson, Daiwa, supra note 53.  
 58. See generally Curtis J. Milhaupt, In the Shadow of Delaware? The Rise of Hostile Takeovers 
in Japan, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2171 (2005). 
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Are there enough specific areas where important changes in actual 
corporate governance practices, and not just in formal law, add up to a 
significant change in corporate governance, i.e., a significant increase in 
the monitoring of management and/or a meaningful constraint on 
management discretion and authority? Emphasis on this monitoring 
criterion arguably leads to a closer call than the standard analysis, which 
looks for a new, significant emphasis on the maximization of shareholder 
value and finds no significant change in Japanese corporate governance. 
CONCLUSION 
There can be considerable debate and differences of opinion as to 
whether legal reforms in Japan have led to significant “real” change. This 
Essay’s examination of the legal profession and corporate governance 
emphasizes that the answer will depend on the criteria used to analyze the 
significance of such change. And that is a methodological point that 
deserves far more serious consideration than it has received to date. 
Haley’s criteria for measuring change are well within the mainstream 
of comparative studies and constitute a reasonable approach for measuring 
transformational change. However, this Essay suggests that it might well 
be useful to change our focus from the extremely rare case of systemic 
change to a set of criteria that is arguably more suitable for measuring 
significant change. This Essay’s application of a new set of criteria does, 
indeed, lead to different results than the standard analysis. In the case of 
the legal profession, a focus on demand, as well as supply, and an 
expansion in the role of lawyers arguably point to significant change in the 
legal profession. In the area of corporate governance, a greater emphasis 
on the monitoring of management and change in ownership structure, 
rather than on maximization of shareholder value, may result in a closer 
question than generally acknowledged, with important changes in 
corporate practice in a number of areas. 
Today, Japan might be willing to engage in Russell Baker’s tongue-in-
cheek trade of cars for lawyers. Anyone with a serious interest in how this 
change came about and the limits of change in Japan could do no better 
than to read the works of John Haley. Given Haley’s unique and extensive 
background in Japanese and comparative law and comparative studies, he 
is ideally situated to extend his work on continuity and change to devise 
new, more nuanced approaches to meaningfully measure legal reform and 
societal change. His work will continue to light the path for the rest of us 
to follow. 
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